The history of disease and health in colonial Sri Lanka has been largely ignored. Historians of colonial economic and social policies in that country have produced a deluge of materials without mentioning the impact of colonial labour policy on the health of the indigenous people.' Meanwhile, even those who have written on the history of medicine in Sri Lanka have not fully accounted for colonial labour practices that had a significant impact on health.2 This conspicuous neglect by both medical and social historians has contributed to the prevailing notion that the medicine brought by European colonial forces saved the lives of millions of people in the colonies.3 Instead, medicine and medical services were introduced to the colonies for the self-interested concerns of the colonizers themselves, and were "constrained ideologically, financially and politically from broader and more effective involvement in the health of the population".4 An integrated study of the history of disease and health in colonial Sri Lanka must examine the implications of economic policies for the health of the indigenous people. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, I will examine how British colonial labour policy in Sri Lanka resulted in an epidemic of hookworm disease on the plantations and in neighbouring villages. It is argued that the laissez-faire policy of the colonial government enabled the planters to ignore basic requirements such as the water supply and latrines for the workers in favour of their own economic goals. Second, I will discuss the involvement of Rockefeller
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I
The British conquered the Kandyan Kingdom of Sri Lanka in 1815, burning numerous villages and desolating large tracts of land.5 Dr Henry Marshall, a senior medical officer of the 89th Regiment that led the war against the Kandyan Kingdom, wrote that after such devastation amongst the Kandyans it would be "impossible to establish a cordial or social union with them".6 The bitterness of the war remained in the minds of the Kandyan Sinhalese for a long period. When the British established plantation industries in central Sri Lanka during the mid-nineteenth century, the Kandyans were unwilling to work on the estates. The planters had no choice but to recruit labour from neighbouring India for the year-round work on the plantations. From the early nineteenth century, Indian workers had been employed in coffee, sugar, rubber and tea plantations in more than a dozen British colonies. It was their labour, along with British capital, which built the overseas wealth of Britain.7 From the very beginning, the government of Sri Lanka maintained a very clear and firm policy towards the recruitment of Indian labour. It was argued that Sri Lanka was close enough to India for the planters themselves to make the appropriate arrangements to recruit workers as their economic interests dictated. This laissez-faire policy differed markedly from that of other British colonies. According to the labour law in India, labourers could be recruited only for Mauritius, British Guiana, Jamaica, and Trinidad, where the abolition of slavery had caused serious labour shortages. The Colonial Office in London and the colonial governments in those countries felt obliged to find replacements for the slave labour force.8 The availability of cheap manpower in India provided the solution for the colonial governments, which realized the importance of a free flow of labour for their economies and became actively engaged in recruiting Indian workers for their plantations. However, as the situation was different in Sri Lanka, the government never felt such an obligation to its planters and therefore adopted a strong policy of non-intervention. The inconsistency of the labour policy shows that neither the Colonial Office nor the government of Sri Lanka acted with honesty in their handling of the recruitment of Indian labour for the plantations of Sri Lanka.9
The workers were recruited in India by the estates' agents, or "Kanganies", who acted as leaders of each group of up to one hundred workers. Kanganies took the workers to Sri Lanka, and supervised their work on the plantations. In addition to their salaries as supervisors, the Kanganies received two cents per day from the wage of each labourer under their supervision."' A Kangany generally supervised up to one hundred labourers and he himself would work as a labourer if the number of workers was small. Often acting as a mediator between the management and the workers, he was "the medium of all advances made to labourers, and he was often the sole debtor to the estate". " Further, Kanganies received a bonus when their workers tumed up, and therefore they made every effort to bring as many workers as possible to the plantations. This direct control by the Kanganies and the plantation management led to widespread exploitation and abuse of the workers.
The periods of high immigration coincided with the expansion of the plantation industries: coffee in the years between 1841 and 1880, tea from 1890 to 1910, and rubber in the first two decades of the twentieth century. By the turn of the century (at the height of the plantation economy), about 100,000 workers plus their families arrived annually in Sri Lanka.'2 According to the 1911 census, there were about 500,000 immigrant workers scattered over 1,900 estates in the central, southern and western provinces of the island. 3 The apparent discrepancy between the census and the annual rate of arrival is accounted for by the high death toll and by the fact that a large number of incapacitated workers returned each year.'4 Workers came by boat to the northwest coast of Sri Lanka; from there they walked for about two weeks to the plantations in the central province. The long march along undeveloped interior jungle roads was extremely hazardous and they faced the threat of malaria. Many workers succumbed to disease, starvation, and exhaustion on their way to the plantations. Those who did arrive were unfit to begin work for several days. Without warm clothes and protection from the cool and damp climate of the hillside plantations, the workers became even more vulnerable to diseases: "Few gangs of coolies arrived on the estates without some deaths occurring on the road, but more took place after arrival on the estates, being worn with the journey and changes of climate".'5 The plantation organizations in Sri Lanka, such as the Ceylon Agricultural Society, repeatedly requested direct government involvement in the recruitment and the welfare of the plantation labourers. It asked the government to establish, as a minimum, basic welfare facilities for the workers during their long journey from India. The Society maintained that the construction of resthouses and "' Jane Philips, 'The hookworm campaign in Ceylon', in Harvard M. Teaf and Peter G. Franck (eds), Hands. acro.s frontiers: case studies in technzicail cooperation, Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff's, 1955, p. 274 hospitals for the workers along the interior road to the plantations would ease their difficult journey. To finance such services it suggested that the government spend a proportion of the money made from land sales on the welfare of the workers. '6 A large majority of these Indian labourers came from the lowest social strata of the Hindu caste hierarchy. According to this system, people of the lower castes were expected to undertake the most menial or despised occupations in Indian society. Because of their low status at home, many of these people became willing recruits, going to the other British colonies only to pursue equally menial occupations. They did not achieve anything by migrating, but simply exchanged "one situation of casual, intermittent, poorly paid labour for a similar situation in the new country"..'7 For almost a century, British colonial administrators were confronted with evidence that the planting interests exploited Indian labourers in ways which could not be tolerated by a "decent, humane society".'8 Yet the administrators continued to defend the indentured labour system, claiming that these wrongs were mere abuses and irregularities which were "amenable to reform". One of the most common official justifications for the working and living conditions of Indian labourers in various colonies was that their situation was not any better in India. Improvements, it was argued, could be worked out through negotiations with the planters. Because of such prevalent attitudes in the rank and file of the colonial administration there was no public outcry or abolitionist campaigns in Britain against indentured labour. The irony was that British officials actively campaigned against the exploitative customs of the Hindu caste system in India, but they turned a blind eye when it came to the deliberate exploitation by British plantation companies of Indian labourers elsewhere. Indentured labour was finally stopped in the early twentieth century only because of the opposition of Indians themselves to the practice.19
The planters were required to provide accommodation and hospital care for the workers. The workers lived in barrack-like "lines" which consisted of a double row of rooms back to back. Each family was given two small rooms; in one they slept, and in the other they cooked on the floor. As many as twelve people lived in a room of 8 by 10 feet. The small verandas of the lines were used to keep goats, cattle, chickens or any other livestock that each family owned. There were no windows in the rooms and the verandas were boarded up to keep out the drenching monsoon rains, a practice which also kept out much needed light. The most unhealthy aspect of these living conditions was that the lines were not provided with latrines; the planters maintained that the workers would not use them even if they were built.20 As a result, the entire vicinity surrounding the lines became the repository of night-soil and other household refuse. Hence, the sanitary conditions on the estates were deplorable.2'
As for the economic argument, the workers were paid on the basis of work "units" similar to that of piecework in factories. If the workers were in good physical condition they could "6Ceylon Agricultural Society, Proceedings, first report, Colombo, 1842, pp. 3(-1.
7 Tinker, op. cit., note 7 above, p. xiii. 18 Ibid., pp. xiv-xv. "' P. C. Emmer, 'The meek Hindu: the recruitment of Indian indentured labourers for service overseas, 1870-1916', in P. C. Emmer (ed.), Colonialism and migration: indentured labour before and after slavery, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986, pp. 187-207. 21) RA, Relief and control of hookworm disease in Ceylon, 1918, pp. 6-7, RG. 5, Se. 2, Box 47. 2' RA, op. cit., note 12 above, pp. 1-4. complete more units of work a day, and be paid accordingly. Conversely, of course, workers in poor health earned less.22 As a result of this arrangement, the entire family often worked under all climatic conditions in order to complete the assigned work units. Children started working in the fields as early as six years of age.23 On the other hand, because of the ready supply of labour by the Kanganies, the planters perceived no direct economic benefit from maintaining even the most basic sanitary requirements on the plantations let alone from improving those conditions. Incapacitated workers could simply be replaced. II In the extremely unhealthy sanitary conditions on the plantations, the workers and their families encountered a wide range of parasitic and infectious diseases. The annual reports of the Principal Civil Medical Officer (hereafter PCMO) on the health and sanitary conditions of the island provide the rate of infections, hospitalization, and death among various groups of the population. Hookworm disease was first reported in the annual report of the PCMO of Sri Lanka in 1888, when 31 cases were diagnosed.24 They were all immigrant labourers from the plantation districts. As the number of reported cases of hookworm infection rapidly increased among plantation workers, health officials became convinced that the disease had been brought by labourers from India. Consequently, for the first time, the 1891 returns of the Registrar General of Ceylon reported that "the disease had been introduced to the island by the Indian cooly".25 Following that year, almost every annual report of the PCMO, the Registrar General of Ceylon, the Inspector General of Hospitals, and various other organizations, emphasized the high rate of hookworm infection among immigrant workers. They warned the authorities in Sri Lanka that the disease was rapidly spreading into neighbouring villages due to the poor sanitary conditions on the plantations. Although at this time only a few cases of hookworm-related deaths were reported in the north, north-central and eastern provinces, where there were no plantations, generally the whole island was affected by the disease.26 Speaking to the Indian Medical Congress in 1894, Dr Thornhill, the Senior Medical Officer of the province of Uva, argued that "Whether the disease existed among the Sinhalese in the past time or not, I can only say that it is now widespread amongst them in the Uva and other provinces of Ceylon, apparently mostly in the provinces where immigrants from India are employed".27 In 1897, the Registrar General of Ceylon reported that out of 262 deaths registered from hookworm disease, over 80 per cent were immigrant workers. The report stated that the disease must be more prevalent than had been noticed by the health authorities: "There is reason to believe that mortality from anchylostomiasis [hookworm disease] is much understated owing to the difficulty of diagnosing the disease, and that to this disease is really due a large number of deaths now returned as due to diarrhoea, dysentery, anaemia, dropsy, debility, and fever. The disease has been introduced into Ceylon by the Indian Cooly." Further, it stated that "it is a more insidious and dangerous enemy than cholera and requires to be met by systematic 28 measures of prevention".
Health authorities continued to point to immigrant workers as being the carriers of the disease. Sir Allan Perry, the PCMO, reported again in 1899 that:
This disease, like many others in the island, is brought over from India by the Malabar coolies ... Unfortunately the disease is not confined to the hosts who bring the parasites, but it is spread broadcast from the habits of the cooly, who pollutes the soil with his excreta and thus affects the water supply of others. The disease, in consequence, is said to be on the increase.29
In its annual report on Sri Lanka, the Mining Journal, Railway and Commercial Gazette in 1904 wamed the authorities that unless proper measures were introduced the disease would soon reach a catastrophic level with a large number of immigrants arriving on the island every year. It stated that hookworm disease was "constantly introduced from India by Malabar coolies ... The disease is on the increase. There were 1,775 admissions in all hospitals, with 272 deaths. The largest number was treated in the General Hospital, Colombo, viz. 756 admissions with 38 deaths. A large number of cases occurs in the planting districts".30 By 1909, the gravity of the situation was such that over 90 per cent of the plantation workers had been infected and the death toll was rising.
Hookworms are tiny parasites about one-half of an inch in length. Although parasitic in the bowel, the worms enter the human body through the pores of the skin when they come in contact with soil polluted by human excreta. The victims of hookworm infection suffer from undernutrition, anaemia and lassitude. Drained of blood, hookworm sufferers are too weak to resist new infections, which usually cause their death.3' By the turn of the century, hookworm infection was a common health problem in many of the British colonies.32 Being concerned with the ill health and the high death toll of the colonial labour force, the British Medical Association set up a committee, that included Sir Patrick Manson and J. S. Haldane, to study the hookworm problem in the colonies. Having considered the reports from the several Colonies, with the observations of the committee upon them, I recognize that the loss of labour caused by the prevalence of anchylostomiasis is very serious, and affects prejudicially not only the employers of labour, but the community at large. Not only is there serious loss of life, direct and indirect, but also through the invaliding of labourers, the charges for hospitals and pauper expenditure are largely increased. This loss is, in my opinion, largely avoidable. Experience has shown that certain simple, well-understood, and inexpensive measures can be adopted, which, if properly carried out, will reduce the evil effects of anchylostomiasis to a negligible quantity.34 Although Crewe's communique indicates concern about the problem, his reference to the planters' economic losses reflects an inadequate understanding of the labour recruitment practices that existed on the plantations. Moreover, his comments do not appear to have been sufficiently forceful to compel the colonial government-already committed to a non-intervention policy to take any direct action. Not surprisingly, Crewe's communique did not produce any tangible improvements in the sanitary conditions on the plantations. The Governor, H. E. McCallum, appointed a committee consisting of several government officials and planters to recommend measures for the control of the disease, but took no concrete action. The committee suggested basically the same measures that had already been recommended by the PCMO, Sir Allan Perry, in 1903. 35 The government's and the planter's ability to respond to medical crises, not to mention their priorities, is evident in the case of the fatal disease knownl as sprue. Sprue was characterized by chronic diarrhoea affecting Europeans, but not the natives.36 The European planting community and the colonial administration were extremely concerned by the disease. They promptly responded with a joint effort to deal with the problem. The Planters' Association and the government together established a fund amounting to £1,000 (£750 from the government and £250 from the Planters' Association) to carry out research. Further indicating the level of official concern, Patrick Manson, a highly regarded authority on tropical disease, and his son-in-law Philip Manson-Bahr, were both brought to Sri Lanka at the Governor's request to undertake research on the disease between 1912 and 1914.37 The Planters' Association was a powerful political body which exercised a great deal of influence on the political affairs of the country. At the outset of the hookworm epidemic, the colonial government underestimated the political power of the Planters' Association and tried to interfere with their business. For example, when the PCMO distributed a pamphlet describing the hookworm infection on the plantations, the planters reacted angrily. They observed, pointedly, that the "government has done nothing for them as to hookworm disease for 20 years although fully conscious of the problem".38 Since the government was unwilling to commit itself financially to affairs it had long maintained were the planters', it purposely avoided making recommendations that might involve capital spending and antagonize the planters further. Consequently, the recommendations 4 Ibid., p. 1.
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-6 P. H. Bahr, A relmort oni re.searches omi sprime in CeYlon, 1912 -1914 University Press, 1915. p. 19. 31 Ibid., p. 1-2. 3x RA, op. cit., note 13 above, pp. 5-6. of the committee appointed by Governor McCallum tended to be superficial, considering the current understanding of the disease. It recommended that all workers arriving in Sri Lanka be treated with beta-naphthol until the rate of infection declined to a negligible level. With respect to the prevention of the disease, it recommended that every set of lines and its immediate surroundings be swept clean once a day and that any deposit of excreta be carefully removed and buried. In addition, at least 12 feet around the lines were to be cleared of all vegetation; and the verandas were not to be enclosed or occupied by livestock. It is critical to note however, that, given the importance of latrines in preventing the continuing spread of the disease, the committee issued no direct orders to construct them. The language used in the report reflects the relative weight given to each of the points it makes. In all, the report contained nine points, of which eight were explicit "recommendations" while the construction of latrines was only "urged".39
For a variety of reasons, therefore, the effective control of hookworm disease on the plantations was prevented by the ideological, political and economic interests of the colonial government. The official viewpoint was that hookworm disease on the plantations was a problem for the planters to deal with in accordance with their own economic objectives. The planters, on the other hand, perceived no direct economic benefit from controlling and curing the disease; they tried to maximize their profit by ignoring even the most basic sanitary requirements of the workers.
For their part, the workers could ill afford to take time off for medical treatment which would result in loss of wages. After taking medication, they could not work for a day or two due to various effects of the treatment. According to Dr J. E. Snodgrass:
The most frequent complaint is of pains in the arms, legs, or other parts of the body-it is believed that the pains referred to are in large part due to the effect of the purgative in conjunction with the wet and fairly cold weather, and perhaps to the somewhat debilitated condition of many of the patients. An improper and probably insufficient food supply no doubt has a bearing on many of the phenomena.40
Because of these consequences, workers were reluctant to follow the treatment; this was interpreted by the planters as the result of ignorance and superstition.4' Moreover, the poor sanitary condition of their living quarters was generally attributed to the cultural character of the people. It was argued that "the Oriental could not be sanitated; he always had lived in filth and squalor; to persuade him to live any other way was hopeless; he was happy in his present mode of existence and it would be a shame to disturb him".42 The poor socio-economic condition of these labourers in India was used by the planters as the standard for determining the services to be provided on the plantations in Sri Lanka. The assertion that these people would not use sanitary facilities even if they were provided was mainly prompted by the economic concerns of the planters. We may assume that, even lacking a detailed knowledge of the hookworm's life-cycle, or "germ theory", little encouragement would be required for a labourer to discern the value of a clean and functional latrine. In general, neither the government nor the planters acted upon the hookworm problem adequately, due to their own self-interested concerns. As a result, the disease became an epidemic in many parts of the island. By 1916, as is shown in Table 1 , over 90 per cent of the labour force on the plantations was infected with it.43 It was under these circumstances that the International Health Board (hereafter IHB) of the Rockefeller Foundation became interested in setting up a hookworm control programme in Sri Lanka. Brown,4s Rockefeller philanthropists became interested in undertaking public health programmes in these colonies for specific economic and political reasons: 1) control of the Soina Hewa economic resources and markets of those non-industrialized countries was necessary for sustained economic growth in the United States; 2) economic and political relations with the people of the colonies would facilitate future investments of surplus capital in those countries by industrial capitalists; 3) poor health and disease were believed to be an obstacle to those agrarian people receiving the benefit of civilization. If Western medicine could eliminate these diseases, the people of the colonies would be more receptive to Western social and cultural values, making increased American economic and political influence possible in those societies. Frederick Gates, a founding member of the IHB, wrote to Rockefeller Sr: "all the nations and all the islands of the sea are actually opened and offer a free field for the light and philanthropy of the English speaking people". He went on to observe that, "Missionary enterprise, viewed solely from a commercial standpoint, is immensely profitable... Imports from heathen lands furnish us cheaply with many of the luxuries of life. . ..46 The IHB had its own reasons for selecting Sri Lanka for a hookworm control programme: "Ceylon was regarded as the key to the situation in the East, particularly for work in British colonies".47 Among the specific reasons for selecting Sri Lanka, Wickliffe Rose, the Director of the IHB, recognized the importance of agriculture as a viable economic medium and the country's location at a cultural crossroads in the East which would be ideal for spreading the new knowledge.4" When the IHB first approached them, the colonial government and the planters strongly objected to the proposed plan to start a hookworm control campaign on the plantations.
The Governor at the time, Sir Thomas Chalmers, stated that he did not want "any Yankee men or Yankee methods introduced; Ceylon was capable of running its own affairs and paying for its own health work".49 However, the government and the planters were eventually convinced by Rockefeller representatives that improved health would also mean increased productivity and reduced absenteeism. They argued that "a healthy labourer is an asset to an estate while an unhealthy labourer is a partial liability. It appears economical therefore to keep labourers healthy"'.5) The representative of the IHB in the East, Dr Victor Heiser, strengthened the argument by noting that "disease never stays at home in its natural breeding place of filth, but is ever and again breaking into the precincts of its more cleanly neighbours".5' As a further incentive, the IHB was prepared to bear more than half the cost of the project, which neither the government nor the planters could refuse. Also, by that time the relationship between the planters and the government had reached its lowest point over the issue of sanitation on the plantations. Therefore, both sides were ready to use the opportunity in order to break the deadlock. Although the easy supply of workers continued unabated, it can be suggested that the planters had their own reasons for wishing to improve their relations with the government.
With the approval of the colonial government and the Planters' Association, the In spite of these improvements in the health of workers, they were not sufficient to convince the planters to undertake the major sanitary reforms suggested by the IHB. As has been noted, the crucial requirement for the control of hookworm disease was the construction of latrines. Although the planters had agreed to construct latrines at the beginning of the campaign, they did not honour their commitment. Because of the pressure of the IHB, the government introduced legislation making it compulsory for all the estates to provide sufficient latrines for the workers' lines.55 In order to comply with the law, many estates constructed latrines using temporary materials such as cadjan and jute bagging which did not last more than a few weeks. Therefore the persistent soil pollution on the plantations combined with the arrival of infected new workers from India contributed to a high rate of re-infection. Faced with this situation the government took no significant action. Although voicing agreement for the plan initially, the lack of real 12 RA, Working plan for the reliefand control ofanchlostoiniasis in Cevlon, 1916, pp. In no case were the latrines in the right position. They were too far away, and not handy enough to the lines they were intended to serve.... The latrines were also ill-constructed, roofs too low, no drains, platforms laid on ground level instead of on a raised stone work, and many of them rotten and unsafe.6
In 1919, three years after the completion of treatment in Matale district, a sample of about 3,000 workers were given post-campaign treatment. Examination of the excreta of these workers showed that there was a high rate of re-infection among those who had been cured in 1917. As shown in Figure 1 , on 33 estates of the district, the average rate of re-infection was 88 per cent, while the level of re-infection ranged from as low as 45 per cent to as high as 100 per cent. In all the other plantation districts the post-campaign examinations showed high rates of re-infection.
IV
The hookworm control campaign on the plantations failed to achieve its goal because the sanitary conditions were not improved while the treatments were being carried out. The continued soil pollution on the estates and in the neighbouring villages created a cycle of re-infection which prevented total eradication of the disease. It became clear to the IHB that neither the government nor the Planters' Association was seriously concerned about the hookworm problem. Although sharing the cost of the programme, the government was not fully committed to the objective of improving sanitary conditions on the estates. It did not want to antagonize the Planters' Association by forcing them to construct latrines, nor did it want to construct latrines on the estates as this might appear to be a change of government policy toward the plantations. For their part, the planters believed that they could overcome the persistent complaints against them by letting the IHB medical personnel treat their labourers. Anything beyond that which required capital spending was not something that they were prepared to undertake. The planters insisted that they could not make a substantial capital outlay to improve sanitary conditions in the context of the depressed financial situation in the tea and rubber markets following World War I. At this juncture, the hookworm control campaign on the plantations came to an abrupt end; the IHB felt that there was no point in carrying out treatment on the estates unless the sanitary conditions were improved to prevent soil pollution. The complete eradication of the hookworm disease on the plantations, according to the IHB, required the following measures: 1) the estates were to comply with basic sanitary requirements such as the construction of appropriate latrines in the workers' lines; 2) all new workers were to be treated upon their arrival at the estates; 3) until sanitation was well enough established to prevent re-infection, one round of treatment was to be repeated each year; 4) arrangements were to be made to treat workers while they were in quarantine camps in southern India.58
On 18 January 1921, the Hookworm Control Committee met at the office of the Colonial Secretary to discuss the future of the campaign. The chairman of the committee, the The hookworm epidemic in colonial Sri Lanka 1916 and 1919: this amounted to $122,538.64 The high operational cost during this period was due to extensive preliminary examinations of patients during the early part of the campaign. After 1919 the programme was modified to reduce the cost of examination. Although the government shared the cost with the IHB, the annual reports of the campaign do not provide information on the government's share. Therefore, the above figures represent only a portion of the cost. The government provided for the salaries and expenses of local subordinate staff, drugs, equipment, offices and office supplies. The annual reports of the IHB describe the government's spending as "an approximately equal division of the expense of the work".65 If that was the case, it can be suggested that from 1916 to 1922 the IHB and the government jointly spent approximately $400,000 for the hookworm control programme on the plantations.
The deaths from hookworm disease did not decline during this period. For example, out of ten major plantation districts where an extensive treatment programme had been carried out, in only one (Matale) had the number of deaths been reduced (by 13 per cent) between 1916 and 1919. In all the others, hookworm-related deaths continued to increase during the campaign, with disproportionately high numbers from 1917 to 1918, which were the years of the influenza epidemic. When the campaign began in 1916, an average hookworm related death rate for these ten districts was 520, which rose to a peak of 619 in 1919. Several explanations have been given for this increase: 1) that doctors became aware of the disease and were making facile diagnoses, resulting in the attribution of more deaths to hookworm infection; 2) a rice shortage on the plantations during World War I changed the diet to rougher foods which aggravated the disease; 3) for the first time, an administrative mechanism was developed to obtain accurate registration of vital statistics in 1919.66 Despite these official interpretations of the increased deaths during the campaign, one cannot overlook the fact that the treatments could not prevent continued re-infection due to the poor sanitary conditions. Although the campaign reduced the number of worms each infected individual harboured, the rate of re-infection increased over time with the unabated soil pollution. This was the major factor that was never adequately tackled on the estates. Almost every annual report of the project directors and field doctors referred to the poor sanitary conditions, but the problem was always brushed off with temporary solutions by the planters and the government. Given the transparent importance of sanitation in controlling hookworm disease, it is hard to comprehend why the construction of latrines on the plantations was not given priority in the hookworm control campaign. It is in response to this question that the remainder of the paper is addressed. V First the respective situation of, and the relationship between, the planters and the government will be briefly reiterated. Leaving aside lengthy commentary on the callous treatment of those in their employ, it should be clear that the planters' reluctance to construct latrines rested principally on the issue of profit. They knew that it would cost them a certain amount of money to build the necessary permanent latrines and they perceived no economic or legal impediments to disregard such needs. The sanitation problem caused no serious labour shortages, owing to the ready supply of workers from India. Further, the planters enjoyed relative immunity from prosecution for failure to comply with even those sanitary regulations already in place. For its part, having begun to experience a degree of cordiality with the planters by the time of the programme's implementation, the government seems to have been reluctant to press its legal hand over the matter of sanitation. The arrival of the Rockefeller "philanthropic" medicine provided the government with some means to move away from its mutually confrontational relations with the planters in a way which would not jeopardize its dubious laissez-faire policy. The government was decidedly unwilling to accept responsibility for sanitary services as it reasoned this might-in the perception of the planters-appear to be a retreat from its own (self-serving) policy of non-interference. Realizing that endorsement of the hookworm campaign was necessary, given the influence of the Planters' Association on the Colonial Office in London, the government of Sri Lanka eventually acquiesced, conceiving no harm in playing a supportive role in the campaign. But the government's stated goal of eradicating hookworm disease was not its primary objective. This led to the curious result that it spent what was for that time a considerable amount of money on a largely futile exercise.
Finally, what accounts for the Rockefeller doctors' own failure to pursue more vigorously the importance of sanitary reforms on the plantations? Owing to past experience, they were well-informed about the crucial relationship between latrines and the hookworm infection. This is often evident in their reports; for example, referring to the experience in Puerto Rico, a staff member of the IHB recalled:
Although Puerto Rico has a population of approximately one million and has already spent $347,000 on hookworm, we found an infection rate over 90 per cent in 2000 examinations at various test points among the rural population. Fully 80 per cent of the houses have no latrines. The trouble is that all the money was spent on relief measures and very little effective sanitation was accomplished.67 Frequent reference is made by the project director and the field doctors to the necessity of latrines on the plantations in Sri Lanka. The temporary latrines which were constructed during the campaign lasted only a few weeks, after which the problem of sanitation again became the major concern. Reflecting a considerable level of frustration, one field doctor reported:
We are doing our best to prevent soil pollution on the various estates, ... At the present time, the [latrine] structures are unserviceable and unsafe. They are not used except perhaps in one or two instances. It is very desirable that new structures of permanent materials be constructed as soon as convenient. It is considered important that as little wood, mud walls, or cadjan as possible be used. It is advisable that stone, bricks, or tiles be used.68
From the beginning of its sojourn in Sri Lanka, senior representatives of the IHB employed formidable diplomatic tact in bringing together the two hostile parties-the government and the Planters' Association-in order to initiate the campaign on the plantations. To a certain extent it would seem that this rhetorical current of diplomacy became the predominant tenor of discourse, imbuing all subsequent relations. And since it was so important in initiating the campaign it was difficult to interrupt. As a result, the representatives of the IHB were required to play the role of mediator or broker between the government and planters, which compromised their ability to advocate sanitary reforms more forcefully in conjunction with treatments.69 Moreover, despite the field doctors' continual reports of the sanitary problems on the plantations, there was no significant effort on the part of high-ranking officials to convert these concerns into tangible reforms.
However, there is another dimension to the failure of the hookworm campaign in Sri Lanka. It is that, being both trained and socialized by the theories and values of Western medicine, the medical personnel involved were products of, and enamoured with, the emerging biomedical model. The IHB did not pursue the question of latrines forcefully with either the government or the planters because its aim was to cure the disease. From the very beginning, the success of the campaign was measured in terms of cure, reduced absenteeism, increased productivity and increased fertility on the plantations. These were the specific results that Dr Heiser promised to the chairman of the Planters' Association when he first met him in 1915. When absenteeism was reduced immediately after the first year of the campaign, the enthusiasm was overwhelming-despite the early indications of re-infection. Again in 1919, the IHB did not insist upon sanitary reforms on the estates when the government refused to enforce the existing sanitary regulations. Instead, it went ahead with expanding the campaign to other plantation districts while fully aware of the problem of re-infection on estates where treatment had been completed. The IHB recognized the importance of latrines as an essential step toward the eradication of hookworm disease. Project directors and staff members of the IHB often talked about the prevention of the disease. However, because they were overwhelmed by the "power" of medicine they soon sidestepped the issue when the government and the Planters' Association insisted upon continuing treatment.
For the Rockefeller Foundation, eradication of hookworm disease meant not only the increased productivity of labour but also a wider acceptance of Western cultural values by the people of European colonies. This was considered to be crucial for the future of American economic and political interests in those countries. It is ironic that the money spent on treatment could easily have provided a sufficient number of latrines on the plantations.70 In spite of the persistent suggestions by the field doctors regarding the 69 The government often acknowledged that the unconditional commitment of the IHB to carry out treatment on the estates would help to "heal the break" between the government and the planters. It was widely believed by high-ranking government officials that any support the IHB provided to the planters would help to convince them that the government was behind such support because, as Dr Rutherford, PCMO, put it, "the aid could not have been granted without Government consent". The eventual outcome, according to the PCMO, was a "more kindly reciprocal feeling between planters and Government". RA, Letter, May 24, 1920 
